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I. INTRODUCTION
At the height of the economic recession in 2010, over 2.9 million
foreclosure actions were initiated nationally. 1 While the economy has
improved, the foreclosure crisis lingers. Millions of Americans will face
foreclosure in 2014.2 The U.S. government responded by implementing
the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), a Treasury-sponsored
initiative that aims to prevent foreclosure by encouraging mortgage loan
servicers to modify the mortgages of qualified homeowners.3 The Treasury Department has extended HAMP multiple times—from its original
ending date in 2013 to its present ending date in 2016.4
While HAMP has indeed helped homeowners avoid foreclosure,
the program has spawned an array of litigation as servicer misconduct
runs rampant.5 As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, “the [HAMP] program seems to have created more litigation than it has happy homeowners.”6 Litigation has had varying success for homeowners. Courts were
initially reluctant to enforce Treasury directives regarding HAMP. 7
However, evolving case law has required a shift in strategy for home*
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1. Les Christie, Foreclosures Hit Six-Year Low in 2013, CNN MONEY (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:16
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/16/real_estate/foreclosure-crisis/.
2. Id.
3. See generally John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program
and Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194 (2011).
4. Secretary Lew Unveils New Efforts to Assist Struggling and Prospective Homeowners, Provide More Affordable Options for Renters, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (June 26, 2014), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2444.aspx.
5. Paul Kiel, Bank of America Lied to Homeowners and Rewarded Foreclosures, Former Employees Say, PROPUBLICA (June 14, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/bank-of-america-liedto-homeowners-and-rewarded-foreclosures.
6. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2013).
7. See generally Williams v. Timothy F. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380
(D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009).
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owners to litigate under common law devices and state statutory law,
such as consumer protection acts.8 When servicers violate HAMP Guidelines, courts should afford homeowners legal recourse after the homeowner brings a consumer protection act claim against the servicer.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of HAMP, including an explanation of the loan modification process. In Part III, the
history of HAMP litigation is explored, from its weak beginnings to the
mixed success of current claims. Finally, this Comment analyzes how
homeowners can successfully litigate HAMP claims using consumer protection acts and how courts should respond to servicers’ challenges to
these claims.
II. THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM
As part of the 2008 bailout of the financial industry, the Bush Administration passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA)
of 2008,9 which authorized the creation of the Making Home Affordable
Program (MHA)—an initiative intended to stabilize the housing market
and provide relief for homeowners.10 As part of the MHA, the Treasury
Department introduced HAMP.11 The purpose of HAMP is to reduce the
number of foreclosures by encouraging beneficiaries and servicers to
modify mortgages for homeowners at risk of default or already in default
on their mortgage loan.12 Guidelines issued by the Treasury Department
(HAMP Guidelines) set procedures and rules for participating servicers.13
While the Obama Administration originally estimated that this program
could benefit up to four million homeowners, there were only 939,008
active permanent HAMP loan modifications as of February 2014.14 This
Part explores the roles of HAMP participants, the benefits of HAMP for
homeowners, and the process of HAMP loan modification.

8. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 198–200.
9. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5253 (2008).
10 . MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE
MORTGAGES, VERSION 4.4, at 14 (2014) [hereinafter MHA HANDBOOK], available at
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_44.pdf.
11. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 194.
12. Id. at 194–95.
13. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 14.
14. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 194; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH FEBRUARY 2014 (2014) [hereinafter
HAMP SUMMARY], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/
Documents/February%202014%20MHA%20Report%20final.pdf.
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A. HAMP Participants
HAMP creates a relationship between the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, participating servicers, and homeowners whose residence is
secured by a mortgage.15 The Treasury Department oversees all MHA
programs and publishes the HAMP Guidelines that regulate the loan
modification process.16
Both government-sponsored entities (GSEs), including Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae, and non-government-sponsored entities (nonGSEs) participate in HAMP.17 Non-GSEs participate in HAMP voluntarily,18 and typically do so because they received Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) funds during the 2008 financial industry bailout. 19
Non-GSEs, including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan
Chase, commit to following HAMP Guidelines through signing a Servicer Participation Agreement (SPA) that imposes contractual obligations on the servicer to consider all eligible loans for MHA programs
unless otherwise prohibited.20 HAMP participants service approximately
89% of all first-lien mortgages.21
Homeowners must fit a narrow set of criteria to qualify for a
HAMP loan modification.22 This Comment only examines HAMP Tier 1
modifications as these are the oldest, most common, and as such, the
most widely litigated type of HAMP modifications. Basic criteria for a
HAMP Tier 1 modification include: (1) the mortgage is a first-lien loan
originating on or before January 1, 2009; (2) the homeowner has a documented financial hardship; (3) the mortgage loan is secured by a single
family property; (4) the mortgage loan was not previously modified under HAMP; (5) the mortgage loan is in default or “default is reasonably
foreseeable”; (6) the residence is owner-occupied; and (7) the homeowner’s current monthly mortgage payment is greater than 31% of his gross
monthly income.23 These criteria exclude a number of homeowners, including those who have less conventional sources of income or are un-

15. See MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18 . Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages/
hamp.aspx (last updated July 22, 2012, 2:26 PM).
19. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 195.
20. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 23. Exceptions to SPA include pooling and servicing
agreements (PSAs). Id. PSAs govern the relationship between beneficiaries and servicers. Id.
21. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 195.
22. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 71–79.
23. Id. at 72–73.
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employed.24 However, these homeowners may qualify under other MHA
programs, including the Home Affordable Unemployment Program, the
Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program, or other foreclosure
alternatives, including in-house modifications, short sales, or deed-inlieu.25 Even homeowners who meet the HAMP criteria are not guaranteed a loan modification, as the process requires a substantial amount of
further effort by both the homeowner and the servicer.
B. Benefits of HAMP Participation for Homeowners
Participation in HAMP provides several advantages to homeowners
that are unavailable outside of the HAMP context. Perhaps the most important benefit is that once a homeowner submits a complete loan modification application26 to the servicer, the servicer may not begin or continue foreclosure proceedings.27 Discontinuation of foreclosure proceedings is valuable as it gives the homeowner additional time in his residence and allows him time to explore alternatives to foreclosure. Another
advantage of HAMP is increased transparency in the communication
process between homeowners and servicers.28 HAMP Guidelines provide
that servicers must assign homeowners a “single point of contact”—an
employee of the servicer that the homeowner can contact for information
regarding their loan modification application.29 HAMP Guidelines also
specify that the servicer must provide certain notices to the homeowner,
including when an application is considered complete and whether the
loan modification has been approved.30 This more open system of communication is imperfect at best, but it provides the homeowner with some
important notices, such as when the application has been received. Finally, a servicer cannot charge a homeowner any fees to be considered for a
loan modification.31 These benefits are unique to HAMP, and as such, it
places homeowners on a more even playing field with servicers.

24. For example, a less conventional source of income is a charitable contribution by a church
to a homeowner. This cannot be considered during a HAMP modification, even if properly documented. Id. at 105.
25. Id. at 15. These options are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed further.
26. Servicers can reject homeowners on the grounds that their application is incomplete, but
HAMP Guidelines do not require the servicer to describe how the application is “incomplete.”
27. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 89–92.
28. See id. at 79.
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 79–88.
31. Id. at 80.
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C. The HAMP Loan Modification Process
The HAMP loan modification process typically starts when the
homeowner submits a loan modification application.32 The servicer then
performs a two-step analysis to consider whether the homeowner is eligible for a loan modification: (1) the waterfall approach, and (2) the Net
Present Value (NPV) test.33 Next, servicers offer approved homeowners
a trial period plan (TPP) to ensure homeowners are able to make the
modified monthly mortgage payments before a permanent loan modification is offered.34 Completion of the entire process may span anywhere
from a few months to a few years.35
1. The Loan Modification Application
Homeowners must submit a complete loan modification application
to their mortgage loan servicer for consideration.36 This application includes forms required by HAMP Guidelines, documentation of income,
personal expenses worksheets, and tax returns.37 Income may come from
several sources, including salary/hourly wages, social security benefits,
spousal and domestic support, rental income, income from a business,
and support from other members of the household. 38 However, unemployment benefits are not considered as acceptable income under
HAMP. 39 Income is consistently a problem for homeowners, as many
homeowners default after experiencing a loss of income.40 It is typical
for homeowners to send several loan modification applications to servicers, as servicers can deny applications for being untimely or incomplete.41 Many loan applications result in a paper chase, where the servicer
32. Id. at 92–100.
33. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 775 F. Supp. 2d 255, 256–57 (D.
Mass. 2011) (stating that homeowners submitted applications in January and February 2010 and
commenced litigation two months later). But see In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig.,
880 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228 (D. Mass. 2012) (alleging that the homeowner applied for a modification
starting May 2009 and was denied 14 months later); Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 283 F.R.D.
533, 537–39 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (alleging that homeowners’ loan modification process started in 2009
and continued through December 2011).
36. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 92.
37. Id. at 100–05.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 105.
40. See Chris Fleisher, HAMP Limitations Frustrate Homeowners Trying to Avoid Foreclosure, TRIBLIVE (Sept. 6, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://triblive.com/business/headlines/6659825-74/hampprogram-mortgage#axzz3DhrvcFyS.
41. See, e.g., Sutcliffe, 238 F.R.D. at 537–39 (alleging that homeowner submitted several loan
modification applications).
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continually asks for additional or updated paperwork, extending the loan
modification process and having many homeowners rack up the amount
in arrears.42
Once the servicer does determine that the application is complete, it
forwards the application to its underwriting department for review.43 The
review consists of the four to five-step waterfall approach, followed by
the NPV test.
2. The Waterfall Approach
The overall goal of a loan modification is to bring the homeowner
current on their mortgage loan and to lower the homeowner’s mortgage
payment to a target of 31% of their current monthly income.44 Servicers’
underwriters use a waterfall approach to reach the target payment. The
analysis generally involves up to five steps: (1) capitalization; (2) interest
rate reduction; (3) term extension; (4) principal forbearance; and (5)
principal reduction alternative.45
First, the mortgage loan is capitalized.46 A servicer “capitalizes accrued interest, out-of-pocket escrow advances to third parties, and any
required escrow advances that will be paid to third parties by the servicer.”47 The servicer also capitalizes any “servicing advances that are
made for costs and expenses incurred in performing servicing obligations” such as foreclosure fees.48 Capitalization brings the mortgage current and out of default.49 If the new monthly mortgage payment after capitalization is not equal to or less than 31% of the homeowner’s monthly
income, the underwriter moves to lower the interest rate.50
Next, the interest rate of the mortgage is lowered in increments of
.0125% until the 31% target payment is met, or until the interest rate falls
to the floor rate of 2.0%.51 This step is especially beneficial to homeowners who have an adjustable-rate mortgage as the interest rate becomes
fixed for the lifetime of the loan.52 Then, if necessary, the servicer ex-

42. Arrears is the total amount past due, or rather, the total amount a homeowner would need to
pay to become current on their mortgage loan.
43. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 107.
44. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196.
45. Id.
46. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 111.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196.
51. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 111–12.
52. See id. at 112.
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tends the term of the loan up to 480 months.53 If the 31% target is not
met by term extension, the fourth step in the waterfall process is a principal forbearance.54 Principal forbearances55 do not accrue interest, but the
amount forborn will be due upon transfer of property or maturity of the
mortgage loan, whichever occurs first.56 A possible fifth step is principal
forgiveness, where the servicer forgives part of the mortgage loan in order to allow the homeowner to qualify for HAMP.57 This is not required
by HAMP, and as a result, the majority of HAMP loan modifications do
not include principal forgiveness.58
If the monthly mortgage payment cannot be reduced to the 31%
target payment by the four steps in the waterfall approach, and the servicer is unwilling to forgive part of the unpaid principal balance, then the
application will be denied.59 On the other hand, if the monthly mortgage
payment is reduced to the 31% threshold through the waterfall approach,
then the underwriter moves to the NPV test.60
3. The NPV Test
Generally, NPV is the value of an investment over time.61 In this
context, underwriters use NPV to calculate the value of the mortgage
loan under two different scenarios: (1) if the homeowner receives a loan
modification, and (2) if the servicer forecloses on the property instead.62
The NPV considers a variety of inputs: homeowner income, current
property value, risk of redefault, etc.63 After calculating these inputs, the
underwriter has the value of the mortgage loan under each of the two
alternatives.64 If the NPV for the modified mortgage is higher than the
NPV for the nonmodified mortgage—the modified mortgage is a higher53. Id.
54. Id.
55. A principal forbearance occurs when the servicer agrees to let the homeowner pay off a
portion of the total principal amount owed a later date, usually when the loan has matured or the
property is sold.
56. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 112.
57. Id. at 114.
58. See id.; see also Shahien Nasiripour, Obama’s HAMP Initiative Struggling to Help Homeowners, HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/24/
obama-hamp-mortgage_n_3644187.html (“Treasury data” shows that “about one in seven HAMP
modifications feature principal forgiveness”).
59. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196.
60. Id.
61. Arcadia Corbett, Demystifying Net Present Value (Aug. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Access to Justice Institute, Seattle University School of Law).
62. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196.
63. For a more in-depth look at inputs, see Corbett, supra note 61.
64. Id.
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valued investment than the foreclosed home—then the modification
passes the NPV test, and the servicer must approve the loan modification.65 The servicer has discretion to approve a modification if it fails the
NPV test.66
4. The Trial Period Plan
After submitting a complete loan modification application, undergoing the waterfall approach, and passing the NPV test, the homeowner
is approved for a loan modification.67 Nonetheless, the servicer wants to
be assured that the homeowner is willing and able to make timely mortgage payments. 68 The servicer arranges a TPP where the homeowner
makes a minimum of three payments that are at the target payment
amount determined by the waterfall approach.69 The benefits of a TPP
include a continued stay of foreclosure proceedings and a reduced
monthly mortgage payment. 70 However, homeowners should be aware
that TPPs have credit consequences, as the homeowner is not submitting
full mortgage payments as required under the original, still-valid mortgage loan contract.71 The homeowner must submit the payments on time
or the loan modification application will be rejected.72 If the homeowner
submits three or more timely TPP payments, then the servicer should
offer the homeowner a permanent loan modification. 73 The permanent
loan modification may include a slightly lower or higher monthly mortgage payment than the TPP payment, as any changes in the homeowner’s
financial situation are accounted for in the permanent loan modification.74
5. The Permanent Loan Modification
Upon completion of a TPP, the servicer is required to offer the
homeowner a permanent loan modification.75 Once the permanent loan
65. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 122–23.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 126.
68. See id. at 127.
69. Id. at 126–27.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo, 673 F.3d 547, 574 (7th Cir. 2012) (alleging that homeowner suffered credit consequences from making TPP payments).
72. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 127.
73. Id. This should happen but is not always the case. A large source of HAMP litigation
comes when completed TPPs fail to result in permanent modifications. See, e.g., Wigod, 673 F.3d
547.
74. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 130–31.
75. Id.
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modification is signed and executed, the homeowner becomes current on
their mortgage loan and submits monthly payments to the servicer that
are typically around 31% of the homeowner’s monthly income.76 Homeowners save a median average of $543 per month after executing a permanent loan modification.77
D. Violation of HAMP Guidelines
In the pursuit of obtaining a HAMP loan modification, homeowners
face many hurdles placed by the servicer resulting in a delayed process, a
wrongful denial, or both, of the loan modification application. This can
occur for a variety of reasons, including the servicer’s violation of
HAMP Guidelines.78 Participating servicers have a contractual obligation
to follow HAMP Guidelines through their SPA.79 HAMP Guidelines do
not have the force of law,80 but homeowners have a few different outlets
for remedies when their servicer violates HAMP Guidelines. First,
homeowners may “escalate” their case through the Treasury Department’s MHA Help or the HAMP Solution Center.81 The purpose of these
programs is to work “with the servicer to identify and resolve the case in
a manner consistent with MHA program guidelines.”82 The MHA Help
or HAMP Solution Center contacts the servicer and then provides the
homeowner with an explanation.83 However, this option does not have
the force of law and typically only provides information to the homeowner. Similar to the MHA Help and HAMP Solution Center, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also has a complaint system that allows homeowners to receive information from their servicer. 84 Again,
this option does not have the force of law.85 Finally, homeowners may
bring their situation to their state’s Attorney General, as the National
Mortgage Settlement reinforces obligations on certain servicers to follow
the HAMP Guidelines. 86 The National Mortgage Settlement is outside
76. Id.
77. HAMP SUMMARY, supra note 14.
78. Kiel, supra note 5 (for example, some servicers allegedly engage in deceptive behavior by
sending mass “blitz” denials, regardless of a homeowner’s actual eligibility).
79. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 23.
80. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 197.
81. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 60–63.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Joint State–Federal National Mortgage Servicing Settlement FAQ, JOINT STATE–FEDERAL
NAT’L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/faq (last
visited Apr. 7, 2014).
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the scope of this paper. A third option to resolve HAMP violations is
through litigation. Litigation of any issue regarding the mortgage loan
cannot disqualify a homeowner for a HAMP loan modification.87 Violations of HAMP guidelines have been litigated in federal (including bankruptcy) and state courts under a wide array of claims and with a wide
array of outcomes.
III. A HISTORY OF HAMP LITIGATION
Homeowners brought early HAMP cases under three legal theories:
(1) private right of action in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA); (2) breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries of a SPA; and
(3) procedural due process rights. However, none of these approaches
have proved successful.
A. Private Right of Action
State and federal courts have universally held that HAMP does not
include a private right of action.88 In Marks v. Bank of America, a homeowner filed suit against her servicer, claiming that the servicer violated
HAMP Guidelines and wrongfully foreclosed on her property. 89 The
homeowner argued that there was congressional intent for homeowners
to have enforceable rights against their servicers under HAMP, as the
program’s overarching purpose is to protect the property interests of atrisk homeowners against unnecessary foreclosures. 90 The homeowner
also argued that there is no explicit preclusion to a private right of action
for homeowners in the EESA or HAMP Guidelines. 91 The court disagreed and held that “nowhere in the HAMP Guidelines, nor in the EESA,
does it expressly provide for a private right of action.”92 The court reasoned that because EESA gave compliance authority to other entities,
judicial review of HAMP violations under a private right of action would
not comply with legislative intent. 93 This holding is common, 94 and
HAMP cases should not be litigated under this theory.
87. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 74.
88 . See, e.g., Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-CV-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL
2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010).
89. Id. at *1.
90. Response to Motion to Dismiss at *7–9, Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., 03:10-CV-08039PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010), 2010 WL 3416138.
91. Id. at *16.
92. Marks, 2010 WL 2572988, at *6.
93. Id. at *6–7.
94. See, e.g., Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. Civ. No. 10–987–AC, 2010 WL 5148473 (D.
Or. Dec. 13, 2010); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010 WL 2635773 (N.D.
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B. Third-Party Beneficiaries
Courts have also rejected the theory that homeowners can litigate
against servicers as third-party beneficiaries of the SPAs.95 SPAs create a
contractual obligation between the Treasury Department and a participating servicer to follow HAMP Guidelines.96 For a person to qualify as a
third-party beneficiary, generally, the person must show that the contracting parties created a promise with the intention of benefiting said
third person.97 In addition, courts have added a reasonableness element
for government contracts. 98 In Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., a homeowner sued under the third-party beneficiary theory and
claimed his servicer failed to approve his loan modification application
even though he qualified under HAMP.99 The court held that the homeowner was not a third-party beneficiary because it would be unreasonable for the homeowner to rely on the promises in the servicer’s SPA.100
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the SPAs only require servicers to
consider homeowners for loan modifications with no requirement to actually modify mortgages.101
Similarly, In re Bank of America Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) Contract Litigation involved a class of homeowners
suing under a third-party beneficiary theory.102 The Massachusetts District Court stated: “In determining whether a plaintiff is a third-party
beneficiary to a government contract, courts must first determine whether
the contract intended to provide the plaintiff with a legal cause of action,
not merely whether the plaintiff is within the class the contract was intended to benefit.”103 The court held that the homeowners were not thirdparty beneficiaries, finding no evidence that Congress intended the SPA

Cal. June 30, 2010); Manabat v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., CV F 10-1018 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 2574161
(E.D. Cal. June 25, 2010).
95 . Escobedo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09CV1557 BTM(BLM), 2009 WL
4981618, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009).
96. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 23.
97. See Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *2, *6–7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
302 (1979).
98. Escobedo, 2009 WL 4981618, at *6–7.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id.
102. In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., No.
CIV.A.10-MD-02193-RWZ, 2011 WL 2637222, at *1 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011) (finding no intent to
create private right of action for third-party beneficiaries).
103. See id. at *3; see generally Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 131 S. Ct. 1342
(2011).
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to provide homeowners with a private right of action.104 Precedent has
uniformly held that homeowners are not third-party beneficiaries of
HAMP.105
C. Procedural Due Process
Finally, courts have held that HAMP does not expand homeowners’
procedural due process rights. 106 In Williams v. Timothy F. Geithner,
plaintiff homeowners argued that HAMP Guidelines created a right to a
loan modification, and thus created a property interest.107 The homeowners claimed that they were deprived of this property interest by their servicers without the procedural due process right of notice.108 Homeowners
additionally argued that HAMP Guidelines supplemented this procedural
due process right of notice with specific notice duties for servicers.109
The court ruled against the homeowners, declaring that HAMP did not
create any property interests in addition to the property interests inherent
in the homeowners’ mortgage loan contracts.110 The court reasoned that
there was no absolute right to a loan modification guaranteed under a
plain language reading of the HAMP Guidelines: “It is not ‘language of
an unmistakably mandatory character.’”111 In conclusion, HAMP Guidelines provide no additional procedural due process rights to homeowners.112
D. Current HAMP Litigation
After the failure of the private right of action, third-party beneficiary theories, and procedural due process claims, HAMP litigation began to turn to common law and state statutory claims.113 Litigation under
torts claims such as negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, and infliction
of emotional distress, in addition to breach of contract claims—outside

104. In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., 2011
WL 2637222, at *3.
105. See, e.g., Pennington v. PNC Mortg., No. 2:10CV361, 2010 WL 8741958, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 11, 2010).
106. Williams v. Timothy F. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, at *5–7 (D.
Minn. Nov. 9, 2009).
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id. at *6.
111. Id.
112. See generally id.
113. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 200.
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of the SPA context—began to fill the courts.114 These claims have had
mixed results.115
Breach of contract claims have become one of the most prevalent
and successful trends in HAMP litigation.116 In a landmark Seventh Circuit case, Wigod v. Wells Fargo, the homeowner entered a TPP agreement with the servicer.117 The terms of the TPP agreement provided that
the servicer would permanently modify the homeowner’s mortgage upon
completion of four timely TPP payments.118 The homeowner alleged that
she fully complied with the terms of the TPP agreement, and the servicer
then breached the TPP by refusing to modify her mortgage. 119 The
homeowner sued, arguing that the TPP was a valid contract that created
an obligation on the servicer to permanently modify her mortgage loan in
exchange for her completion of the TPP payments.120 In considering a
motion to dismiss, the court held that the homeowner’s allegations, if
true, sustained a breach of contract claim against the servicer. 121 The
Ninth Circuit followed Wigod in Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and
held that failure to permanently modify a homeowner’s mortgage loan
after promising to do so in a TPP agreement is a breach of contract.122
These are promising results for homeowners who reach the TPP stage,
but servicers are changing their practices to avoid making conditional
promises of permanent loan modifications in TPPs,123 and this legal theory can only help homeowners offered a TPP. In contrast, homeowners at
any stage in the loan modification process are potentially able to litigate
under consumer protection act (CPA) violations.
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT CLAIMS IN HAMP LITIGATION
CPAs are state statutes designed to “regulate business activities
[and] provid[e] a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers
to persons conducting such activities.”124 These statutes provide relief for
114. Id.
115. Id. at 194 (discussing various state law tort claims in the HAMP context).
116. Arsen Sarapinian, Note, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 919 (2013).
117. Wigod v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 558 (7th Cir. 2012).
118. Id. at 558–59.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 559.
122. Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2013).
123. See Reitz v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC., 954 F. Supp. 2d 870, 885 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (showing an example of language in the TPP that did not obligate servicer to modify a mortgage after
completion of a TPP).
124. Donald M. Zupanex, Annotation, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practice
and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3D 449 § 2(a) (1979).
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consumers when businesses engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that are not otherwise prohibited by statute.125 Most CPAs have intentionally broad language that gives great discretion to the courts to define
what is unfair or deceptive.126 Types of relief available vary from state to
state, but typically include injunctive relief and actual damages.127 Actions that could be considered unfair or deceptive acts or practices include general misrepresentations and fraud.128 While misrepresentations
and fraud may be actionable on their own, some CPA statutes provide
that these claims do not have to meet all the common law elements of
their name to be litigated as CPA violations.129 Additionally, some states
limit CPA claims to actions that affect the public interest.130 This Part
analyzes (1) the elements of a HAMP CPA claim as illustrated in a recent Massachusetts case; (2) what constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or
practices in the HAMP context; and (3) other factors considered by the
courts when they review these CPA claims.
A. Massachusetts and Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P.
Massachusetts has seen its fair share of HAMP litigation under
CPA claims. Massachusetts’ CPA is typical: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”131 Relief available to consumers in Massachusetts includes compensatory damages, injunctive
relief, attorneys’ costs and fees, and double or treble damages. 132 “To
prevail on a [CPA] claim, the plaintiff ‘must prove that a person who is
engaged in trade or business committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice and that the [plaintiff] suffered a loss of money or property as a result.’”133As the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently noted, “[C]onsumer protection statutes—and Massachusetts’
broadly interpreted [CPA] in particular—have become an attractive alternative means of attempting to recover for alleged HAMP violations
where no action is otherwise available.”134
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. §§ 3(a), (4).
129. Id. § 2(a).
130. Id. § 3(c).
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 2014).
132 . 31 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & LAURIE J. SARTORIO, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES,
EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 28.8 (3d ed. 2011).
133. Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 775 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259 (D. Mass. 2011).
134. Okoye v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 10-11563-DPW, 2011 WL 3269686, at *7 (D. Mass.
July 28, 2011).
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Homeowners have successfully litigated HAMP violations under
Massachusetts’ CPA in large number.135 For example, in Morris v. BAC
Home Loans Servicing, L.P., the homeowners experienced financial
hardship and defaulted on their mortgage loan.136 The homeowners submitted multiple HAMP loan modification applications to their servicer,
Bank of America. 137 According to the homeowners, Bank of America
sent them “a non-HAMP modification agreement that did not comply
with HAMP [G]uidelines.”138 The homeowners also claimed that Bank of
America failed to acknowledge receipt of their loan modification application and failed to respond to their application in a timely manner.139 If
true, all are clear violations of HAMP Guidelines.140 The homeowners
filed suit, alleging, among other claims, that Bank of America engaged in
unfair or deceptive acts or practices by violating specific HAMP Guidelines.141
The court reasoned that violations of HAMP Guidelines are not per
se CPA violations, but the violations can be used as evidence of a CPA
violation if the alleged action is independently unfair or deceptive. 142
Under this standard, the homeowners had to prove three elements: (1)
that Bank of America engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices; (2)
that the homeowners suffered loss or injury; and (3) that loss or injury
was proximately caused by Bank of America’s actions.143
For the first element, the homeowners argued that violating HAMP
Guidelines was an unfair practice, as Bank of America has made representations to the public (via its SPA) that it would abide by these guidelines.144 For the second element, the homeowners alleged that they suffered loss or injury by the damage to their credit, the loss of time spent
preparing the loan modification application (in some instances, submitting the application multiple times), the accumulating interest, and the
unnecessary initiation of foreclosure action by Bank of America.145 For
the third element, the homeowners argued that Bank of America’s failure
to timely evaluate the homeowners for HAMP was the proximate cause

135. Morris, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
136. See id. at 257.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 259.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 260.
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of the wrongful continuation of foreclosure proceedings and substantial
arrearages.146
The court held that if the facts alleged were true, Bank of America
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices by repeatedly failing to
respond to the homeowners’ complete loan modification applications.147
The court agreed with the homeowners that Bank of America agreed to
consider loan modification applications in its SPA and failing to do so
was inherently unfair.148 This was a great victory for homeowners. This
result, however, is not universal, and courts continually redefine what
HAMP violations are considered unfair or deceptive.
B. HAMP Violations as Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
In the HAMP context, the staple of any CPA claim is proof that the
servicer engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. As most CPAs
do not statutorily define “unfair” or “deceptive,” courts have broad discretion to determine whether a HAMP violation supports a CPA claim.
However, several HAMP cases have given guidance as to which violations of HAMP Guidelines are considered unfair or deceptive.149
1. What Actions are Unfair or Deceptive?
Violations of some HAMP Guidelines have been successfully litigated as unfair or deceptive. These violations include:
1. “instructing mortgagors to stop making mortgage payments
with the false assurance that doing so will not hurt their
credit scores and is a necessary step in obtaining a loan
modification;”
2. “misrepresenting the status of loan modification applications;”
3. “misrepresenting the status of mortgagors’ accounts;” and
4. “refusing to put statements in writing when asked.”150
Furthermore, misrepresentations about HAMP eligibility requirements, misrepresentations about a modification complying with HAMP,
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 160.
149. See generally In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 880 F. Supp. 2d 220,
237–38 (D. Mass. 2012); Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. C 10-03892 WHA, 2011
WL 1134451 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, at 930 (N.D.
Ill. March 28, 2011); Okoye v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 10-11563-DPW, 2011 WL 3269686, at
*9–10 (D. Mass. July 28, 2011).
150. In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
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and failure to grant a permanent loan modification after completion of a
TPP have all been considered unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
Misrepresenting that a homeowner must be in default in order to
apply for a loan application is an unfair act.151 In Fletcher v. OneWest
Bank, the servicer allegedly told the homeowner that she must default on
her mortgage loan in order to apply for a HAMP loan modification.152
The homeowner argued that this misrepresentation was unfair and deceptive, as she relied upon it and purposefully defaulted on her mortgage.153
The servicer responded that, if true, this was a misrepresentation of law,
not fact, and the homeowner could not have reasonably been expected to
rely on this statement.154 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois refused to dismiss the CPA claim because it disagreed with the
servicer’s characterization of the statement as a misrepresentation of
law.155 The court reasoned:
Depending on how the statement was worded, it might have been a
straightforward statement about how Fletcher could legally qualify
for a loan modification under HAMP. However, it may have also
been a factual statement about when OneWest would consider her
for a loan modification. The statement would have been deceptive
since OneWest had agreed to follow the HAMP [G]uidelines, but it
was not necessarily a statement about what those guidelines were.156

Misrepresenting that a loan modification complies with HAMP
Guidelines can also be unfair or deceptive.157 In Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo,
the homeowner argued that the servicer engaged in unfair or deceptive
acts or practices by offering the homeowner a loan modification that did
not comply with HAMP Guidelines.158 In holding that the facts alleged a
sufficient CPA violation, the court reasoned that the homeowner could
have reasonably “understood [the loan modification] as offering a trial
plan that complied with HAMP when in fact, it did not.”159
Failing to grant a permanent modification after completion of a TPP
can also result in a CPA violation. 160 In Okoye v. Bank of New York
151. Fletcher, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 928–29, 934.
154. Id. at 934.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 283 F.R.D. 533, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Okoye v. Bank of N.Y Mellon, No. 10-11563-DPW, 2011 WL 3269686, at *10 (D. Mass.
July 28, 2011).
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Mellon, the homeowners alleged that their servicer violated HAMP
Guidelines by failing to modify the homeowners’ mortgage after successful completion of a TPP and after several representations by the servicer promising such action. 161 Furthermore, HAMP Guidelines proscribe the result promised by the servicer.162 The court allowed the claim
to survive summary judgment. 163 The legally significant fact here was
not that a HAMP Guideline proscribed completion of a TPP shall result
in a permanent loan modification, but that the servicer made a representation about such a result.164 The court considered this misrepresentation
independently unfair.165
2. What Actions Are Not Unfair or Deceptive?
Courts have little patience for litigation of technical violations of
HAMP and summarily dismiss complaints that allege only these types of
violations.166 Examples include clerical errors that resulted in wrongfully
sent notices or untimely reviews of a loan modification application.167
“[D]ecisions generally have required allegations of more than mere technical violations and clerical errors to support a [CPA] claim predicated
on HAMP violation.”168 This only reinforces the principle that any violation of a HAMP Guideline is not necessarily unfair or deceptive.169
C. Other Considerations
In addition to the general requirements of CPA claims, courts consider several other factors to determine whether a CPA claim based on
HAMP violations should be dismissed. 170 For example, Massachusetts
developed its own set of elements for addressing these claims:
(1) [H]ave plaintiffs adequately plead that defendant violated
HAMP; (2) are those violations of the type that would be independently actionable conduct under chapter 93A [Massachusetts’
161. Id. at *6–7.
162. MHA HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 131.
163. Okoye, 2011 WL 3269686, at *10.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *9.
167. Kozaryn v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D. Mass. 2011);
Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 775 F. Supp. 2d 255, 263 (D. Mass. 2011) (stating
plaintiff’s allegations that the servicer did not timely provide appropriate notifications is not enough
to substantiate a CPA violation).
168. Okoye, 2011 WL 3269686, at *9; see also Kozaryn, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
169. Kozaryn, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
170. Morris, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (considering policy rationale); Okoye, 2011 WL 3269686,
at *8 (considering independence of claim from HAMP).
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CPA] even absent violation of a statutory provision (i.e. are the violations unfair or deceptive); and (3) if the conduct is actionable, is
recovery pursuant to chapter 93A compatible with the “objectives
and enforcement mechanisms” of HAMP?171

These three elements, well established in Massachusetts, are also
found in variants throughout most of the successfully litigated HAMP
CPA claims.172 This section focuses on these common elements of successful HAMP CPA cases: (1) violations of HAMP guidelines as evidence of the action being unfair or deceptive; (2) actions being pleaded
as unfair or deceptive independent of HAMP; and (3) policy rationale for
HAMP CPA litigation.
1. Violations of HAMP Guidelines as Evidence
Although CPAs vary as to whether the unfair act must be “tethered”
to a statutory provision or agency regulation, pleading specific violations
of HAMP Guidelines is persuasive in any jurisdiction.173 In CPAs without a tethering requirement, courts have considered violations of HAMP
Guidelines as evidence that an act or practice is inherently unfair or deceptive.174 “Violations of agency directives like [HAMP] can be a hallmark of unfairness under the [CPA].”175 In contrast, homeowners in jurisdictions requiring “tethering” must show specific actions that violate
HAMP Guidelines.176 For example, a recent Sixth Circuit case required
that the homeowner specify particular violations of HAMP Guidelines in
his pleadings for the CPA claim to proceed. 177 Because of the weight
given to tethered claims, homeowners should always specify particular
violations of HAMP Guidelines in their allegations regardless of a jurisdiction’s tethering requirements.

171. Morris, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
172. See generally id.; Okoye, 2011 WL 3269686, at *8; In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 880 F. Supp. 2d 220, 237–38 (D. Mass. 2012); Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. C 10-03892 WHA, 2011 WL 1134451 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
173. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (West 2004), with CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17200 (West 1992).
174. See generally Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 787 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
175. Id.
176. Compare Jackson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-5793, 2011 WL 587587, at *10
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011), with Humphreys v. Bank of Am., 557 F. App’x 416, 425 (6th Cir. 2014).
177. Compare Humphreys, 557 F. App’x at 425, with Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10CV-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010) (where the mere mention of
HAMP Guidelines precluded all recovery).
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2. Independently Unfair and Deceptive
Many courts require the homeowner show that the servicer’s actions, pleaded as HAMP violations, are unfair or deceptive in their own
right, independent of HAMP.178 These courts agree with servicers’ private right of action arguments, but still reason that servicers cannot be
“wholly immunized for their conduct so long as the subject transaction is
associated with HAMP.”179 This allows homeowners to litigate against
servicers for significant grievances such as the failure to consider the
homeowner for a loan modification or violating a TPP agreement.180 The
degree of independence required varies by court, with some requiring
complete independence181 and other courts using violations of HAMP as
evidence of unfairness, mentioned above.182
Misrepresentations are independently actionable. 183 In Okoye v.
Bank of New York Mellon, the servicer allegedly represented that homeowners would be offered a permanent loan modification if they complied
with the terms of the TPP agreement.184 The homeowners complied with
the terms of the TPP, but the servicer refused to offer them a permanent
loan modification.185 The court sustained the CPA claim.186 It reasoned
“HAMP violations can give rise to a viable [CPA] claim if the activity
would be independently actionable under [the CPA] as unfair and deceptive.”187 The court noted that the “[servicer’s] denial of the [homeowner’s] application for loan modification itself may not amount to unfair or
deceptive practices action under [the CPA], and indeed may not even
allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that any HAMP Guidelines were
violated.”188 However, the court reasoned that the alleged misrepresentation regarding the promise of a permanent loan modification was enough
to substantiate a CPA claim, as misrepresentations are generally actiona-

178. See, e.g., Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *4 (D.
Or. 2010); Okoye v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 10-11563-DPW, 2011 WL 3269686, at *6–10 (D.
Mass. 2011); In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 880 F. Supp. 2d 220, 237–38 (D.
Mass. 2012).
179. Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5 (dismissing the homeowners’ claims but noting that servicers can be liable for misconduct involving HAMP).
180. Id.; Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 787 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
181. See, e.g., Okoye, 2011 WL 329686, at *8.
182. Morris v. BAC Loan Servicing, LLP, 775 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259 (D. Mass. 2011).
183. See, e.g., Okoye, 2011 WL 3269686, at *9.
184. Id. at *1–3.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *10.
187. Id. at *8.
188. Id. at *10.
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ble under CPAs. 189 Thus, the homeowner effectively established independence.190
3. Policy Rationale
Finally, courts address whether allowing litigation to continue
would be consistent with HAMP’s purposes, with overwhelmingly successful results for homeowners and consumer advocates.191 Courts look
primarily to HAMP for the purpose of: “help[ing] homeowners avoid
foreclosure by obtaining loan modifications.” 192 Specifically, it can be
“assume[d] that one purpose of Congress in enacting the 2008 Act [the
EESA] was to ensure mortgage servicers participated in the foreclosure
mitigation programs [i.e., HAMP] it empowered the Treasury Department to set up.”193 HAMP Guidelines protect homeowners from servicing misconduct, and as such, courts should allow CPA litigation to address violations of HAMP Guidelines because it furthers the general purpose of HAMP and EESA.
V. CHALLENGES TO HAMP CPA LITIGATION
HAMP litigation continues to face many challenges as the program
grows. As homeowners change their litigation strategies, servicers continue to raise new challenges. First, servicers consistently raise preemption challenges. 194 Second, servicers argue that homeowners disguise
HAMP violations as CPA claims to circumvent the commonly held principle that there is no private right of action in EESA.195 Finally, courts
routinely dismiss HAMP litigation for failure to properly plead causation, especially when homeowners defaulted on their mortgage loan before applying for a modification.196 This section addresses all three major
arguments presented by servicers and discusses why the courts should
reject each.

189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Morris v. BAC Loan Servicing, LLP, 775 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259 (D. Mass. 2011); Boyd v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 787 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
192. Morris, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
193. Wigod v. Wells Fargo, 673 F.3d 547, 580 (7th Cir. 2011).
194. See generally Olivares v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-1626 ADM/JJK, 2011 WL 4860167, at
*2 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2011).
195. See, e.g., Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 10-CV-03057-FDC/GGH, 2011
WL 127891 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011); Torres v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. 1:10-cv-01709OWW-SKO, 2011 WL 149833 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011); Morales v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. C
10-02068 JSW, 2011 WL 1670045 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11 2011).
196. Kozaryn v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D. Mass. 2011).
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A. Preemption
“Preemption can take on three different forms: express preemption,
field preemption, and conflict preemption.”197 Express preemption is typically not raised in HAMP litigation cases, as the statutory language in
EESA does not speak to this issue.198 Therefore, this section focuses on
field preemption and conflict preemption.
Field preemption “occurs when ‘federal regulation [is] so pervasive
that the only reasonable inference is that [Congress] meant to displace
the states’ from their own regulation.”199 Servicers typically argue that
EESA or the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA) occupies the field of loan
modifications or mortgage lending, respectively.200 Courts should reject
this argument because HAMP targets a small subset of homeowners—
primarily those who were victims of subprime lending prior to 2009.201
Furthermore, servicers offer loan modifications outside HAMP.202 “Servicers and [homeowners remain] free to modify home loans under common law principles of contracts or pursuant to other federal, state, or local programs,” and as such, “HAMP does not preempt the field of home
loan modification.” 203 Additionally, courts should reject any HOLA
preemption argument. The Treasury Department declared that it
“occup[ied] the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations” under HOLA. 204 However, in the same declaration, the
Treasury Department acknowledged,
[S]tate tort, contract, and commercial laws are “not preempted to
the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending operations of
Federal savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the
purposes of [HOLA].”205

Furthermore, in Wigod, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that HOLA does
not give the Treasury Department authority to “adjudicate disputes” between servicers and homeowners.206 Thus, like EESA, courts should fol-

197. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576 (quoting Aux Sable Liquid Prods. v. Murphy, 526 F.3d 1028,
1033 (7th Cir. 2008)).
198. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–53 (2008).
199. Olivares, 2011 WL 4860167, at *4.
200. See, e.g., id.
201. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 196.
202. Id.
203. Olivares, 2011 WL 4860167, at *4 (quoting Wuebker v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 418 F.3d 883,
885 (8th Cir. 2005).
204. Wigod v. Wells Fargo, 673 F.3d 547, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a)).
205. Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c))
206. Id.
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low the Seventh Circuit approach and hold that HOLA does not preempt
HAMP litigation.207
Servicers also raise conflict preemption challenges. Conflict
preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, or when state law is in conflict with the purposes of the federal law. 208 Courts should reject the conflict preemption challenge because there is nothing preventing servicers from complying with both
HAMP Guidelines and state consumer protection acts as the SPAs impose a contractual obligation on servicers to comply with state and federal law along with HAMP Guidelines.209 In addition, precedent exists in
the Seventh Circuit to reject conflict preemption arguments.210 In Wigod,
the court reasoned that CPAs impose no additional obligations on servicers beyond their duties imposed by HAMP. 211 “Where federal law
supplies the standard of care imposed by state law, it is hard to see how
they could conflict.” 212 Therefore, courts should reject servicers’ field
and conflict preemption arguments by citing to the Treasury Department’s intent in EESA and HOLA and by citing to servicers’ contractual
obligations in the SPAs.
B. Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing
The crux of servicers’ defenses against CPA claims is that homeowners use CPAs as cover for the lack of a private right of action in
EESA.213 In other words, servicers argue that CPA claims are a “wolf in
sheep’s clothing.”214 Servicers successfully made this argument in Vida
v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., where the district court in Oregon “explained
that state common law claims cannot be used to enforce federal program
provisions.”215 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-

207. See id.
208. Olivares, 2011 WL 4860167, at *4.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Wigod, 673 F.3d at 579.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Morales v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 WL 1670045 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); Torres v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. 1:10-cv-01709-OWW-SKO, 2011 WL
149833 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011); Grill v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 10-CV-03057FDC/GGH, 2011 WL 127891 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011).
214. See Morales, 2011 WL 1670045; Torres, 2011 WL 149833; Grill, 2011 WL 127891.
215. Arsen Sarapinian, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 920 (2013).
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fornia also followed this approach.216 However, this appears to be a minority view, as the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have each allowed
common law claims based on HAMP violations.217
Courts should reject the reasoning in Vida, even when homeowners
fail to sufficiently plead that the servicer misconduct is independently
unfair or deceptive. The purpose of CPAs is to protect consumers against
conduct that is otherwise not necessarily actionable. 218 HAMP Guidelines do not provide for a private right of action, yet violations of these
guidelines—such as telling the homeowner to default on their mortgage
to obtain a loan modification—are inherently unfair. Therefore, while
homeowners make their strongest case by properly pleading servicer
misconduct is unfair or deceptive in its own right, courts should nonetheless reject the “wolf in sheep’s clothing” argument.
C. CAUSATION
Finally, many homeowners have difficulty proving causation. 219
Homeowners must establish that their servicers proximately caused some
type of injury, such as wrongful foreclosure proceedings (including loss
of the foreclosed home), damage to the homeowner’s credit, loss of alternatives to foreclosure, and additional and unnecessary fees throughout
the prolonged foreclosure process.220
Jurisdictions are currently split on what constitutes causation in this
context. Particularly, some courts are unsympathetic when the homeowners defaulted on their mortgage loan before applying for a modification.221 For example, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California rejected a CPA claim alleging the servicer violated HAMP
Guidelines and caused the homeowner to lose her home to foreclosure.222
The court reasoned the “plaintiff lost her home because she defaulted on
the loan, not because of defendants’ alleged representations that defend216. Morales, 2011 WL 1670045, at *10 (“Plaintiffs therefore may not assert a UCL claim
based on alleged violations of HAMP because the UCL cannot create a private right of action where
none exists under the federal statute.”).
217. See, e.g., Corvello v. Wells Fargo, 728 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2013); Wigod v. Wells
Fargo, 673 F.3d 547, 577 (7th Cir. 2012); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 242 (1st
Cir. 2013).
218. Zupanex, supra note 124, § 2(a).
219. Ortiz v. Am.’s Servicing Co., No. EDCV 12-191 CAS (SPx), 2012 WL 2160953, at *8
(C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012).
220. See, e.g., Young, 717 F.3d at 241; Stagikas v. Saxon Mort. Servs. Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d
129, 137 (D. Mass. 2011); Allen v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. CCB-10-2740, 2011 WL 3425665, at
*10 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2011).
221. Ortiz, 2012 WL 2160953, at *8.
222. Id.
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ants would approve plaintiff for a loan modification.”223 This line of reasoning rests blame on the homeowner, and it fails to acknowledge any
potential servicer misconduct that contributed to the injury. Additionally,
this reasoning fails to acknowledge HAMP’s purpose—preventing foreclosure even in cases where the homeowner is in default.
Courts should reject Ortiz and instead acknowledge that servicer
misconduct proximately causes homeowners injury by extending the loan
modification process, increasing the amount in arrears, and in some cases
actually causing the homeowner to default.224 For example, courts should
find causation when repetitive violations of HAMP Guidelines cause loss
of equity in a home and damage to credit ratings.225 In In re JPMorgan
Chase Mortgage Modification Litigation, a class action alleged the servicer violated Massachusetts’ CPA by violating HAMP Guidelines. 226
The court explored two different classes of homeowners and their causation arguments. 227 One group of homeowners alleged that they owed
more on their mortgages after participating in the loan modification process than what they would have owed if they did not participate in
HAMP. 228 The second group of homeowners alleged that they would
have financially benefited more from being foreclosed upon immediately
rather than foreclosed upon after participating in HAMP. 229 The court
allowed both claims to survive a motion to dismiss.230 The court reasoned
that both sets of homeowners had plausible claims as servicer misconduct could prolong the loan modification process and cause homeowners
to incur late fees, additional interest, and other foreclosure-related fees
that the homeowner would not have incurred otherwise.231
VI. CONCLUSION
HAMP litigation is an emerging area of law. As the foreclosure crisis lingers, homeowners must continually evolve their litigation strategies to address servicer violations of HAMP Guidelines. Consumer protection acts provide one outlet for HAMP litigation, and homeowners can
successfully bring claims under this theory by adequately pleading that
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 880 F. Supp. 2d 220, 238 (D.
Mass. 2012).
225. Young, 717 F.3d at 241–42.
226. In re JPMorgan Chase Mortg. Modification Litig., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
227. Id. at 225, 238.
228. Id. at 238.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.

764

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 38:739

their servicer engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Servicers’
litigation strategies will also continue to evolve, and homeowners must
continue to be creative in their responses. However, courts should allow
the broad language of CPAs to provide a remedy for homeowners when
servicers violate HAMP Guidelines and enforce the policy behind CPAs
to protect consumers, and more particularly, homeowners, from unfair or
deceptive acts and practices of mortgage servicers.

